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Under-Paid Shop Stewards:  
A Case of Strategic Discrimination?
An Econometric Analysis Using 2010 REPONSE Data*
Jérôme Bourdieu**, Thomas Breda***
Instances of discrimination against union members continue to accumulate 
in France, as can be seen by the multiplication of legal proceedings and 
judgements against a number of large firms. This qualitative impression was 
underpinned by the statistical results from the 2004 French REPONSE (Re-
lations professionnelles et négociations d’entreprise) survey (the equivalent 
of the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey), revealing that, at 
the same age and education, union representatives are paid around 10% less 
than their colleagues. We here confirm this result in the 2010 wave of the 
same survey. Union membership does not suffice to explain these lower 
wages: it is rather shop stewards, who are the most active in the defence of 
workers’ interests, who are the most heavily penalised. It is in practice dif-
ficult to establish that these workers receive lower wages for reasons other 
than their union responsibilities. The wage gap for union members who are 
not representatives is much smaller, at around 4%, while it is in firms that 
experience conflictual labour relations that shop stewards are paid the least.
In a macroeconomic environment of persistent unemployment and slow growth, the perspective of job loss is frightening, and the defence of workers’ interests 
can become increasingly difficult. In this context, there has been growing qualitative 
evidence of discrimination against union members.1 Since 2000, a number of large 
1. See for example the numerous individual testimonies in the annual report of the Observatoire des répressions et 
discriminations syndicales (Union Repression and Discrimination Observatory).
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French firms have paid out compensation to dozens of individuals following lawsuits 
alleging union discrimination (Semaine Sociale lamy, 2004).
These particular cases could be exceptional or atypical: the experiences and 
testimony of these individuals may not correspond to the reality of most workers. 
However, the results from the analysis of the 2004 Relations professionnelles et négo-
ciations d’entreprise (REPONSE) survey carried out by the Direction de l’animation 
de la recherche, des études et des statistiques (DARES) suggest that this is actually 
a widespread phenomenon, with a pay gap of around 10% between shop stewards 
and their non-unionised colleagues, once observable characteristics (like sex, age 
and education) have been controlled for (Breda, 2014). The analogous wage gap for 
workers who are union members (but not shop stewards) is smaller and not statistically 
significant.
These results suggest that workers are penalised according to the extent of their 
engagement in the defence of their collective interests. We here investigate this hy-
pothesis using the latest wave of the REPONSE survey, which provides greater detail 
on the degree of worker engagement.
We have four groups of employees, split up by union status and the degree of 
worker representation. The first group (the control group here) are neither unionised nor 
worker representatives. We then have worker representatives who are not unionised, 
and union members who are not representatives. The fourth group includes workers 
who are both unionised and representatives. Of these, only some (around a third) 
participate in official bargaining and have the mandate to sign off on the resulting 
agreements: these are the Délégués syndicaux and we will call them shop stewards.
The new question that appears in the 2010 survey allows us to estimate the 2010 
wage gap between worker representatives who are union members, worker representa-
tives who are not union members and their colleagues. Our aim is thus to see whether 
the wage gap of shop stewards results from their union membership or rather from 
their activism. This produces a finer description of the way in which workers’ interests 
are defended in firms, taking into account both the type of negotiation forum (e.g., 
obligatory annual negotiations versus consultation) and union membership.
Using an indirect method of identifying shop stewards, we reveal their particular 
outcomes: as we will see, they suffer from the greatest wage penalties, with other 
union members, whether they are worker representatives or not, having smaller pen-
alties and non-unionised worker representatives no wage penalty at all. The analysis 
of the promotions, both past and future, and socio-professional categories of these 
different groups of workers shows that the observed wage gaps result from different 
promotion rates. In addition, these wage gaps are not found in all firms. For example, 
when a firm specifically negotiates over union organisation and employee expression 
rights, or when the obligatory annual negotiations do not take place (even though 
they should have done), neither unionised worker representatives nor shop stewards 
suffer any wage penalty. Our first section will present these results.
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After having set out the position of worker representatives in the bargaining pro-
cess, we propose a theoretical interpretation of the wage penalties uncovered by our 
statistical analysis: these are argued to reflect a “strategic” discrimination that aims 
to protect the interests of employers for whom bargaining, in particular over wages, 
can be costly. Other potential interpretations (taste-based discrimination, adverse 
selection, statistical discrimination, and self-censorship by shop stewards) will also 
be discussed, particularly with respect to the particularity of union engagement. As 
the available data do not allow us to reach a conclusion about the causal mechanisms 
behind our results, the discussion aims to clarify the different concepts of discrimi-
nation and adverse selection, and their limits when applied to the case of worker 
representatives. These latter dedicate part of their work time to their representation 
activity: they therefore do not carry out exactly the same tasks as their non-represent-
ative colleagues, so that it is not formally possible to show that they do not receive 
equal pay for equal work.
Wage and Promotion Gaps between Worker Representatives, 
Union Members and Other Workers
The data from the 2010 REPONSE survey (Box 1) allow us to identify the wages 
of worker representatives. These thus provide a direct measure of the wage gap that 
the latter may suffer from their official status of representing workers’ interests. This 
measure may be seen as a validation of the results obtained for shop stewards in the 
2004 REPONSE data (Breda, 2014) of a wage gap using an indirect identification 
method that will be described below: shop stewards were paid on average 10% less 
than the colleagues that they represented, given their observable characteristics (edu-
cation, age, tenure, etc.). This wage gap grew with tenure, the discrimination that the 
representatives reported, and membership of more campaigning unions such as the 
Confédération générale du travail (General Confederation of Labour – CGT).
Box 1
The REPONSE Survey Matched to DADS1
The empirical analysis is carried out using the three parts of the REPONSE surveys 
from 2004 and 2010.2
The REPONSE survey is managed by the DARES, and is one of the main sources 
of data on industrial relations in France. It is carried out every six years on a sample, 
1. The DADS survey is the Déclarations annuelles de données sociales (Annual Declaration of Social Data).
2. The surveys actually cover the years 2004-2005 and 2010-2011, but are matched to wage data from DADS 
for 2003 and 2009 respectively. For simplicity, we will label these estimations as covering 2004 and 2010, but 
these slight anachronisms should be kept in mind.
Jérôme Bourdieu, Thomas Breda
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The Wages of Unionised and Non-Unionised Worker Representatives,  
and of Unionised Non-Representatives
Table 1 presents in detail our estimations of the wage gap between unionised 
and non-unionised worker representatives, on the one hand, and workers who are 
neither unionised nor representatives (who are the reference category here2). The 
average wage gap (without any control variables) between these groups is only small 
(under 1.5%) and insignificant (column 1). When we include control variables for 
education, sex, age and age-squared, and some basic establishment characteristics 
(industry, size, age and presence of a shop steward3) into the wage equation, we 
find a wage penalty of 3.5% for unionised representatives relative to workers who 
are neither unionised nor representatives. Non-unionised worker representatives do 
2. These estimations cover full-time permanent workers, excluding apprentices, interns and second jobs, with an-
nual declared hours between 900 and 2,200, working in establishments with 10 employees or more in the non-farm 
business sector. The estimations are weighted to ensure the representativeness of the workers in the sample. These 
restrictions and their effect on the results are discussed in the Appendix.
3. The linear regression method used here allows us to estimate the linear relationship between the wage and a num-
ber of other variables that may be of interest (here union status and being a worker representative) or act as controls. 
The wage gaps that are estimated for union members and/or worker representatives are thus corrected for observable 
differences between workers in terms of the control variables introduced in the regression.
in 2010, of 4,000 establishments with 10 employees or more in the non-farm business 
sector.3 A management representative completes a long face-to-face interview in each 
establishment, and replies to a large number of questions covering notably the organisa-
tion of work, the technologies used, and industrial relations. The replies of the manage-
ment representative constitute the employer part of the survey. When there is one or more 
worker representative in the establishment, the employer is asked to provide the name of 
one of the principal establishment worker representatives. These representatives are then 
interviewed. In 2010 we have a sample of 2,433 interviews in the “worker representa-
tive” part of the survey. Last, the “employee” part of the survey comes from a random 
sample of 10 employees per establishment who receive a questionnaire by mail (in each 
establishment, all employees with over one year of tenure have the same probability of 
being interviewed). Given the response rate of around 30%, which is typical for mail 
surveys, the final sample includes information on just under three employees per estab-
lishment on average. When we match the employer and employee parts of the survey, we 
have in 2010 a sample of 11,334 employees in 4,023 establishments.
As the employee parts of the REPONSE surveys in 2004 and 2010 had already been 
matched to the DADS dataset by the DARES, we have information on the net hourly 
wage of each employee in the final sample as of December 31st 2009 for the 2010 sur-
vey, and December 31st 2003 for the 2004 survey. The DADS data are also used as an 
alternative source for some other variables, such as establishment size.
3. Previous waves covered establishments with 50 employees or more in 1992, and establishments with 20 
employees or more in 1998 and 2004, each time in the non-farm business sector.
2017 Special Edition – Travail et Emploi –  9
Under-Paid Shop Stewards: A Case of Strategic Discrimination?
not however suffer from any wage penalty, while the wage gap of unionised non-
representatives is also about 3.5% relative to workers who are neither unionised nor 
representatives (column 2).
The most important explanatory variables behind the change in the wage gaps 
between columns 1 and 2 are age and establishment size: worker representatives 
are older and are more likely to be found in larger establishments than workers in 
the control group (Table 2), and both age and establishment size are associated with 
higher hourly wages. Adding worker tenure (as a quadratic) increases the wage pen-
alty for unionised worker representatives somewhat to 4.5% (column 3 of Table 1): 
union members and worker representatives both have longer establishment tenure, 
and so higher wages.
TaBle 1 –  Wage Gaps between Worker Representatives, Union Members and their Colleagues  
in 2009
Dependent Variable: log of hourly wages (DADS 2009)

















































Observations 12,318 7,695 7,606 7,606 12,189 12,046 12,046
R² 0.000 0.490 0.503 0.667 0.794 0.801 0.871
















Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions are weighted at the employee level using the weights supplied by the DARES with the survey. The 
individual-level controls called “Mincer” are education (9 categories), age (in years), age-squared and sex. The individual 
controls called “Detailed” include in addition tenure and tenure-squared, socio-professional group (4 categories) and the 
number of hours worked. The “Standard” establishment controls are size (5 categories), industry (16 categories), region 
(10 categories), age (5 categories) and a dummy for the presence of a union representative. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Interpretation: Without any control variables (column 1), the log hourly wage of a non-representative union member is 0.014 higher 
on average than that of a worker who is neither unionised nor a representative (the control group).
Field: Full-time permanent workers, excluding apprentices, interns and second jobs, with annual declared hours between 900 and 
2,200, working in establishments with 10 employees or more in the non-farm business sector.
Source: The employer and employee parts of the 2010 REPONSE survey, matched to DADS data.
Jérôme Bourdieu, Thomas Breda
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TaBle 2 –  Percentage of Union Members and Worker Representatives by Establishment 
Characteristics and Worker Socio-Demographic Characteristics

















All 6.4 2.8 3.6 11.0 8.9 32.9
Sex
Men 6.9 2.9 4.0 11.8 10.1 34.1
Women 5.7 2.7 3.0 9.8 7.2 31.0
Socio-professional category
Blue-collar 
workers 6.7 2.6 4.1 12.8 10.0 32.4
White-collar 
employees 6.3 2.9 3.3 9.6 7.6 34.4
Intermediate 
professions 7.3 3.1 4.3 12.6 10.3 33.9
Managers 4.9 2.7 2.2 7.4 6.9 30.2
Education
No qualifications 5.4 2.2 3.1 13.1 10.6 23.7
Below the 
baccalauréat 6.9 2.6 4.3 12.3 12.0 35.3
Baccalauréat 6.4 3.0 3.4 12.1 8.2 28.3
Over the 
baccalauréat 6.3 3.1 3.2 8.7 5.7 36.8
Working Hours
Full-time 6.8 2.9 4.0 11.3 9.0 34.9
Part-time 4.0 2.2 1.8 9.2 8.2 19.8
Sector
Industry 6.8 3.0 3.8 10.4 8.2 36.8
Construction 6.7 2.4 4.3 15.6 14.8 27.7
Retail 7.4 3.6 3.9 8.8 5.8 44.3
Services 6.5 2.9 3.5 10.8 8.8 32.9
Establishment size
10-19 workers 5.0 3.3 1.7 5.0 7.3 34.0
20-49 workers 6.3 3.7 2.5 7.8 7.9 32.6
50-99 workers 9.0 4.9 4.2 9.9 9.8 42.6
100-199 workers 8.1 3.7 4.5 13.3 8.6 33.6
200-999 workers 6.5 1.0 5.5 15.2 9.0 36.2
> 1 000 workers 3.6 0.2 3.4 14.7 12.2 23.0
Note: All statistics are weighted at the employee level using the weights supplied by the DARES with the REPONSE data.
Field: Workers in establishments with 10 employees or more in the non-farm business sector.
Source: The employer and employee parts of the 2010 REPONSE survey, matched to DADS data.
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The addition of variables reflecting hours of work and worker socio-professional 
category (split into four groups: blue-collar workers, white-collar employees, inter-
mediate professions, and managers) reduces the hourly wage gap between unionised 
workers, worker representatives and their colleagues to zero (column 4): comparing 
worker representatives to other workers of the same socio-professional category, the 
wage penalty disappears. This does not mean (and we will return to this point) that 
there is no wage penalty, but rather that this wage penalty cannot be considered in-
dependently of other employer-choice variables, such as promotions for example, 
which can also be used to discriminate against employees.
The last set of specifications aims to pick up any differences between estab-
lishments in terms of wage policy by introducing fixed effects. Columns 5 to 7 of 
Table 1 reproduce columns 2 to 4, but with establishment fixed effects rather than 
establishment-level controls. Conceptually, this means that we compare union rep-
resentatives and/or union members, and their colleagues who are neither one nor the 
other, establishment by establishment, so that the measured wage gaps between the 
different categories of workers do not reflect wage differences between, for exam-
ple, establishments where there are worker representatives and establishments where 
there are none. These fixed-effect results are similar to those without fixed effects.
Overall, the wage gap between unionised workers (whether they are worker 
representatives or not), and their non-unionised colleagues (again, whether they are 
worker representatives or not) is around 3.5% in 2010, considering workers of the 
same sex, experience, education and in the same establishment. These results sug-
gest that it is union membership rather than being a worker representative that pro-
duces wage penalties.
As in 2004, Shop Stewards Were Less Well-Paid in 2010
The wage penalty suffered by unionised worker representatives in 2010 is nota-
bly smaller than that for shop stewards in 2004 (as estimated in Breda, 2014). There 
are a number of potential explanations of this change. First, there are differences in 
the way in which the wage penalty is estimated: this was indirect and less precise in 
2004; the survey in 2010 now includes firms with 10 to 20 employees; and the key 
right-hand side variable is not the same, as we have switched from shop stewards to 
unionised worker representatives. Second, any change in the wage gap between 2004 
and 2010 could reflect real changes in the labour market that took place over that pe-
riod. The tests that we have carried out indicate that it is the change in the right-hand 
side variable that is mostly behind the change in the results (see Bourdieu, Breda, 
2015, for a detailed analysis).
While the distinction between shop stewards and unionised worker representa-
tives may seem only minor to someone who is not a specialist in industrial relations, 
this is in fact far from the case regarding the duties that they carry out. There are 
far fewer shop stewards than unionised worker representatives. Estimations carried 
Jérôme Bourdieu, Thomas Breda
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out using REPONSE data suggest that there are around 100,000 shop stewards and 
300,000 unionised worker representatives in France in establishments with 10 em-
ployees or more in the non-farm business sector (Table 3). As such, only one union-
ised worker representative in three is a shop steward. The other unionised worker 
representatives are, for example, worker delegates, other union branch managers, or 
union members of the works council or the health and safety committee. The main 
difference between shop stewards and the other unionised worker representatives 
concerns the jobs they do: shop stewards are responsible for the negotiation of the 
collective agreements with the firm, notably during the obligatory annual bargaining 
round covering wages and work conditions, while the other unionised worker rep-
resentatives essentially play a consultative role and aid communication between the 
firm and its workers. Their engagement in bargaining that, in theory, should reduce 
the share of value-added going to the firm puts shop stewards in a notably different 
position. And it is in this group that the wage penalty is the highest.
In order to estimate the particular wage penalty of shop stewards, we need to 
use, in the 2010 data, an indirect identification method analogous to that used for the 
2004 data (Box 2). Shop stewards are not directly identifiable in the “employee” part 
of the 2010 REPONSE survey.
Using the 2004 method, which identifies the probability of being a shop steward 
via the percentage of the latter among union members, we find in the 2010 data a 
wage penalty of around 6% for shop stewards, controlling for education, sex, worker 
experience, and establishment characteristics. This gap falls a little to 5% when we 
TaBle 3 –  The Distribution of Employees by Union and Worker-Representative Status
Unit and %
Whole sample Analysis sample
Population 
represented by the 
survey (in thousands of 
employees in the left-
hand column)
Non-unionised, not representatives 15,702 86.1 10,832 85.3 7,921 86.2
Non-unionised representatives 543 3.0 405 3.2 256 2.8
Unionised, not representatives 1,316 7.2 908 7.2 678 7.4
Unionised representatives 672 3.7 548 4.3 332 3.6
Of which Shop Stewards ≈ 124 ≈ 0.7 ≈ 93 ≈ 0.7 ≈ 93 ≈ 1.0
Total 18,233 100.0 12,693 100.0 9,188 100.0
Note: All statistics are weighted at the employee level using the weights supplied by the DARES with the REPONSE data. For more 
details on the estimation of the number of shop stewards, see Bourdieu, Breda, 2015.
Field: Full-time permanent workers, excluding apprentices, interns and second jobs, with annual declared hours between 900 and 
2,200, working in establishments with 10 employees or more in the non-farm business sector.
Source: The employer and employee parts of the 2010 REPONSE survey, matched to DADS data.
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add establishment fixed effects. These wage gaps are not statistically significant due 
to the inherent imprecision of the method used, but do suggest a greater wage penalty 
for shop stewards.
The three probabilistic identification methods used in 2010 (Box 2) are in line 
with the above result. Controlling for the differences in worker experience and edu-
cation and the differences in establishment size and industry, the wage penalty for 
shop stewards is estimated to be around 5% when compared to the set of worker 
representatives, and 12% compared to the smaller group of unionised worker repre-
sentatives. These wage gaps are larger, at around 10 to 15%, in our preferred specifi-
cation that includes establishment fixed effects.4
4. The full set of results can be found in Bourdieu, Breda (2014), Tables 5A, 5B, 5C, and A3, A4, A5.
Box 2
Three Indirect Identification Strategies for Shop Stewards in 2010
We can estimate the probability that a union member be a shop steward using the 
answers given by management representatives about the number of shop stewards and 
the percentage of union members in the establishment. Multiplying this declared per-
centage of union members by establishment size (which we know from the DADS data-
base), we obtain the number of establishment union members. Dividing the number of 
shop stewards by the number of union members yields the establishment proportion of 
shop stewards amongst the unionised. As the workers in the survey are drawn at random, 
this proportion corresponds to the probability that a unionised worker in an establish-
ment be a shop steward. If the worker is not unionised, the probability of being a shop 
steward is automatically zero (shop stewards have to be union members). This probabil-
ity, which varies from establishment to establishment, is thus sufficient to estimate the 
average wage gap between shop stewards and their colleagues (under the assumption that 
this gap does not vary with this calculated probability: see Breda, 2014).
This “probabilistic” method was previously applied to the 2004 data. In the 2010 
survey we can instead use information from a new question on the number of worker rep-
resentatives, which produces a more accurate estimation of the shop-steward wage pen-
alty. In 2010 the employer provides information on the number of worker representatives 
and unionised worker representatives: we use this information to identify shop stewards, 
not among the set of union members but rather among the more restricted sets of worker 
representatives or even unionised worker representatives. The wage penalty for shop 
stewards is obtained using information about whether the worker is a worker representa-
tive (unionised worker representative) with the probability that a worker representative 
(unionised worker representative) be a shop steward. This method requires assumptions 
over the number of mandates held concurrently by unionised worker representatives (see 
Bourdieu, Breda, 2015, for details).
Jérôme Bourdieu, Thomas Breda
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Each of these three probabilistic identification methods for shop stewards pro-
duces results that are not very precise, in statistical terms, as a result of the indirect 
identification. When probabilistic identification is based on worker representatives, 
the results are nonetheless improved relative to 2004, due to the greater proportion 
of shop stewards among worker representatives than among union members. In addi-
tion, the three measures of the wage gap that we propose are consistent in the sense 
that wage penalties are higher for shop stewards. Given our different estimates that 
all point in the same general direction, we conclude as to a wage gap of around 10% 
for shop stewards, although this figure is only inaccurately estimated.
In conclusion, our analysis of the union wage gap reveals two phenomena: un-
ion members are paid less than their non-union colleagues, and this gap is larger for 
those who have official worker representation responsibilities. And this latter does 
not represent worker representation as such, as we find no evidence of it for non-
union worker representatives.
Wage Gaps Are Explained by Differences in Promotion
Wage gaps, whether for all union members, unionised worker representatives or 
shop stewards, disappear when we control for socio-professional category (Table 1, 
columns 4 and 7). As such, union wage penalties, given age, sex and education, are 
explained by the various types of union members having different jobs than their 
colleagues. This suggests that wage gaps may reflect differences in promotion, as 
current socio-professional category depends on past promotions.
This is confirmed in Table 4, which shows that, controlling for age, sex and 
education, union members (whether they be worker representatives or not) have at 
least a 5% lower chance of having been promoted in the past three years than work-
ers who are neither unionised nor representatives (columns 1 and 2). The results in 
Table 4 are in line with those that we found earlier for wages: it is not being a worker 
representative as such that matters, but rather union membership. In particular, non-
unionised worker representatives do not have lower promotion rates.
The phenomenon is actually more complex than Table 4 suggests: first, shop 
stewards are less likely to be promoted than union members (the statistical results 
are not shown here) but, at the same time, non-unionised worker representatives are 
clearly more likely to be promoted than non-union non-representative workers (the 
control group). The sample average promotion rate over the past three years is 25%: 
the promotion rate of non-unionised representatives is thus estimated to be double 
that of unionised representatives (at 17% and 33% respectively, in column 2’s fixed 
effect specification5).
5. These large gaps in terms of past promotion are also found in future promotion prospects (columns 3 and 4). 
These results are estimated only controlling for worker characteristics that are not at the employer’s discretion: age, 
sex and education.
2017 Special Edition – Travail et Emploi –  15
Under-Paid Shop Stewards: A Case of Strategic Discrimination?
This sharp contrast between unionised and non-unionised representatives is also 
found for the declared future promotion probability over the coming year (columns 3 
and 4 of Table 4) and the risk of job loss (columns 5 and 6). In particular, we note 
that the protection against job loss enjoyed by unionised representatives does not 
prevent them from saying that they are more likely to lose their job than the control 
group.
Wage Gaps Are Not Systematic
The REPONSE survey includes information on whether negotiations over union 
organisation and employee expression rights took place at the establishment or firm 
level, and if these negotiations led to an agreement. While, in theory, the negotia-
tions identified in the REPONSE survey may not have any bearing on the career of 
unionised representatives, in practice, according to practitioners in social legislation, 
union-rights agreements often cover the careers of worker representatives. This is 
confirmed in the report by chappe et al. (2015). We thus assume that the negotiations 
identified by this REPONSE question also cover the careers of union representatives.
Between 2008 and 2010, about 30% of establishments (and 45% of those with 
shop stewards) negotiated over union organisation and employee expression rights 
TaBle 4 –  Worker Representatives and Union Members: Promotion, Pay Rises and Job Loss
Promoted in the last  
3 years
Probability of promotion 
or wage rise over the next 
12 months
Probability of job loss 
over the next 12 months











































Observations 7,369 11,705 6,175 9,800 5,927 9,397
R² 0.062 0.517 0.082 0.591 0.049 0.651
Worker controls Mincer Mincer Mincer Mincer Mincer Mincer
Establishment 
controls
Yes Fixed effects Yes Fixed effects Yes Fixed effects
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The control variables are defined in Table 4. These results come from linear probability models (OLS) with the dependent 
variables all being standardised to have a standard deviation of 1.
Interpretation: Unionised worker representatives have a 5.8% lower chance of having been promoted in the last three years than 
non-union non-worker representative employees (column 1).
Field: Full-time permanent workers, excluding apprentices, interns and second jobs, with annual declared hours between 900 and 
2,200, working in establishments with 10 employees or more in the non-farm business sector.
Source: The employer and employee parts of the 2010 REPONSE survey.
Jérôme Bourdieu, Thomas Breda
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TaBle 5 –  The Prevalence of Bargaining Over Union Organisation 2008-2010 and 2002-2004
As a % of establishments
Conflict








Between 2008 and 2010
All establishments 1.9 71.6 30.2 46.8
Establishments with  
over 300 employees
58.5 61.9
Establishments with a worker 
representative interviewed
2.2 76.3 34.4 46.5
Establishments with a worker 
representative and over  
300 employees
57.7 56.8
Establishments with a shop steward 3.2 79.4 44.8 53.2
Establishments with a shop steward 
and over 300 employees
57.3 59.5
Between 2002 and 2004
All establishments 2.3 69.5 32.7 40.1 
Establishments with  
over 300 employees
53.2 49.3
Establishments with a worker 
representative interviewed
2.7 69.5 34.3 39.3
Establishments with a worker 
representative and over  
300 employees
51.2 47.0
Establishments with a shop steward 3.6 73.3 40.8 42.5
Establishments with a shop steward 
and over 300 employees
50.7 48.7
Note: These figures come from the questions asked of management representatives, and refer to the existence of conflicts and negotia-
tions or agreements over the three years preceding the survey (the 2008-2010 period in REPONSE 2010, and the 2002-2004 period 
for REPONSE 2004).
Interpretation: The proportion of sample establishments that bargained over union organisation and employee expression rights between 
2008 and 2010 is 30.2%. This proportion is 58.5% in establishments belonging to firms with over 300 employees, 34.4% in those where 
a worker representative was interviewed, and 44.8% in those with a shop steward.
Field: Establishments with 10 employees or more in the non-farm business sector.
Source: The employer parts of the 2004 and 2010 REPONSE surveys.
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TaBle 6 –  Wage Gaps between Worker Representatives, Union Members, Shop Stewards  
and their Colleagues in 2009 by Establishment Bargaining over Union Rights
Effect for establishments with shop stewards
No bargaining over union rights Bargaining over union rights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unionised, not representatives −0.074*** −0.094*** −0.010 0.016
(0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.027)
Unionised representatives −0.065*** −0.052** −0.027 −0.002
(0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.031)
Non-unionised representatives − 0.010 −0.005 −0.000 0.015
(0.040) (0.041) (0.056) (0.062)
Observations 2,650 2,661 1,824 1,825
R2 0,499 0,767 0,539 0,769
Worker controls Mincer Mincer Mincer Mincer
Establishment controls Oui Effets fixes Oui Effets fixes
Weighted Oui Oui Oui Oui
Establishments with a shop steward Oui Oui Oui Oui
Bargaining over union rights Non Non Oui Oui
Effect for shop stewards (all establishments)
Method 1 :
Shop Steward − 0.106** −0.148*** 0.016 − 0.031
(0.050) (0.054) (0.058) (0.069)
Non-unionised representatives − 0.002 0.021 −0.047 0.010
(0.021) (0.023) (0.030) (0.035)
Method 2 :
Shop Steward −0.095* −0.049 −0.016 −0.075
(0.052) (0.057) (0.070) (0.085)
Non-unionised representatives −0.059*** −0.066*** −0.016 0.002
(0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029)
Method 3 :
Shop Steward −0.210*** −0.239*** −0.034 −0.079
(0.078) (0.086) (0.081) (0.094)
Non-unionised representatives 0.023 0.062 0.009 0.082
 (0.059) (0.065) (0.070) (0.078)
Note: See the notes to Table 1, Box 2 and Bourdieu, Breda (2015) for details regarding methods 1, 2 and 3 leading to “probabilistic” 
estimations for shop stewards only.
The table shows estimates on two different samples according to the existence of negotiations concerning union rights between 2008 
and 2010. Columns 1 and 2 focus on establishments that did not have such negotiations while columns 3 and 4 focus on establishments 
that did have them.
Interpretation: In establishments that did not have negotiations concerning union organisation rights between 2008 and 2010, union 
members who are not worker representatives are paid in 2009 on average 7.4% less than workers who are neither unionised nor 
representatives (the omitted category), controlling for education, sex, age and establishment characteristics (column 1).
Field: Full-time permanent workers, excluding apprentices, interns and second jobs, with annual declared hours between 900 and 
2,200, working in establishments with 10 employees or more in the non-farm business sector.
Source: The employer and employee parts of the 2010 REPONSE survey, matched to DADS data.
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at the establishment and/or firm level, with around half of these negotiations lead-
ing to an agreement (Table 5). Considering establishments belonging to firms with 
over 300 employees, which are required to negotiate over union organisation by the 
Law of the 20th of August 2008 (Table 5), the negotiation rates are even higher (they 
almost double) but remain well below 100%, so that the legal requirements are not 
always respected.6 The comparison of 2004 and 2010 does suggest that the Law was 
applied in a certain number of firms: negotiations and agreements regarding union 
organisation and employee expression rights rose over the period, and notably in 
firms with over 300 employees.
Table 6 shows that when specific negotiations concerning union organisation 
and employee expression rights take place, wage penalties for worker representa-
tives disappear. Direct estimation shows that in 2009 union members and unionised 
worker representatives suffered a wage penalty only in establishments where there 
were no negotiations concerning union organisation and employee expression rights 
between 2008 and 2010 (non-unionised worker representatives do not receive lower 
wages in any of the specifications). Union-representative wage gaps are therefore not 
systematic, and bargaining specifically targeted at unions’ rights within the work-
place seems to be able to reduce or eliminate them. It is however difficult to be sure 
that the relationship between this type of bargaining and the wage gap is causal. It 
might rather be the case that establishments with better-paid worker representatives 
are more likely to engage in bargaining, so that the estimation results in Table 6 
reflect selection. However, it remains likely that the threat of litigation for union dis-
crimination (chappe, 2015; Semaine Sociale lamy, 2004) has, at least in a number 
of cases, led to successful negotiations of remedial wage rises for unionised worker 
representatives. This shows that those negotiations do not always reflect legal com-
pliance on the part of firms that already pay their worker representatives the same as 
their other employees.
Why are Shop Stewards Paid Less?
A common interpretation of differences in wages for given levels of experience 
and education is discrimination. However, in the absence of compelling evidence 
of discrimination, economists also consider that wage gaps may reflect unobserved 
differences in ability or productivity. Along the same lines, in legal terms, wage dis-
crimination would be dismissed for the benefit of the doubt except in the exceptional 
6. It is possible that the Law be respected at the firm level, but that the management representative at the estab-
lishment level is not aware of this. Union agreements at the firm level may not then be applied in all of the firm’s 
establishments. It is however hard to believe that this applies to all of the 40% of establishments with shop stewards 
belonging to a firm with over 300 employees in which the management representative declared no negotiation over 
union organisation. There are thus certainly a considerable percentage of establishments that do not apply (all of) the 
provisions of the Law of the 20th of August 2008.
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cases where the employee, on whom the burden of proof falls, can show that he is not 
less productive. However, there have been considerable legal changes in the burden 
of proof, with a movement towards the employer having to justify wage differences 
based on productivity (chappe, 2013).
Wage discrimination is defined both in Law and Economics as the violation 
of a principle: the equity principle in Economics –wages reflect productivity– and 
the principle of equality in Law –“equal pay for equal work”. As the work of two 
employees is in reality always different, and as the (marginal) individual productiv-
ity is almost never perfectly observed (notably in the case of joint production pro-
cesses), these principles cannot usually be checked, rendering formal proof of wage 
discrimination almost impossible, either by economists, by employees who demand 
compensation, or by the employer who is accused of discrimination.
While these considerations complicate the establishment of definitive statistical 
proof, they do not exclude the discussion of the different mechanisms that lie behind 
wage gaps, whether these effectively be types of discrimination or the selection of 
employees according to their ability. We below distinguish five different comple-
mentary mechanisms that can produce differences in wages and promotion rates. The 
first three are taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1971), adverse selection (so that 
worker representatives are less productive) and statistical discrimination (arrow, 
1973; phelpS, 1972). These three are part of the standard set of economic explana-
tions of differences in labour-market outcomes between social groups. We propose 
to add to this set a more atypical type of discrimination, which is both strategic and 
particular to the representation of workers’ collective interests. It is this explanation 
that we find the most persuasive, although we cannot definitively reject the others, 
and in any case the sources of wage gaps may in some cases be complementary. Last, 
we discuss the possibility of self-censorship behaviour by worker representatives, 
who may renounce personal gain in order to defend the interests of other workers.
Taste-Based Discrimination
Under taste-based discrimination against a social group the employer has a pref-
erence for individuals who do not belong to this group. Hostility towards unions and 
their members may then be reflected in lower wages for the latter. This taste cannot, 
at least legally, justify the employer’s choices regarding hiring, pay or firing, but 
there are nonetheless many testimonies as to its existence.7
The principle of taste-based discrimination against union members is nonethe-
less difficult to dissociate from the economic and social role that these individuals 
play in the firm, unless we can say that union members have specific characteristics 
that are independent of this role and which render the firm hostile towards them. Any 
7. Michelin is a good example here: see Mousli M. (2011), « Un patron paternaliste et antisyndical », Alternatives 
économiques, no 305, September, p. 78.
Jérôme Bourdieu, Thomas Breda
20  – Travail et Emploi – 2017 Special Edition
aversion felt by the employer with respect to unions is likely not totally independent 
of the fact that unions, as incarnated by unionised worker representatives, defend 
interests that are opposed to their own. In this sense, taste-based discrimination over-
laps with the strategic discrimination that we will discuss below, even though the 
first reflects a global antipathy between unions and firms, while the second refers to 
a local discrimination at the level of the establishment, against certain worker repre-
sentatives linked to their particular role during bargaining.
Adverse Selection
Rather than reflecting employer aversion, the wage gap for union members could 
rather reveal their lower productivity. This may be the point of view of some employ-
ers, for whom union membership and engagement are a way of avoiding productive 
work and shirking. Union members will then be less productive, as only those who 
are less committed to their work become unionised and become representatives, or 
because union membership diverts individuals from their directly productive work 
over and above their statutory time devoted to union activities. Lower union promo-
tion rates can then be explained by the lower productivity of union workers.
These hypotheses are almost impossible to evaluate empirically: there are no 
datasets rich enough to produce an exact measure of worker productivity, to the ex-
tent that the latter can even be measured. We can however make a number of remarks 
about this interpretation, which is also sometimes put forward by employers as a 
justification. First, union wage gaps rise with employee tenure in the establishment: 
they are practically zero for workers with low tenure in both the 2004 and 2010 data.8 
Workers who become unionised or worker representatives at the beginning of their 
establishment career are therefore not penalised, which suggests (without represent-
ing a formal proof) that they were not already less productive when they became 
unionised. In other words, union members and worker representatives do not seem to 
be systematically selected from lower-wage and lower-productivity workers before 
their unionisation.
If it is lower productivity that explains the wage penalty suffered by union mem-
bers and worker representatives, we would expect this to become more apparent after 
joining or taking up office, as it is at this moment of engagement that workers would 
start to invest less in their work. This possibility requires a comment, which applies 
specifically to worker representatives.
These latter, given the time devoted to employee delegation, have statutory ac-
tivities that are not exactly comparable to those of their colleagues over the working 
week. The particular legal provisions that apply to representatives prohibit any wage 
8. See Breda (2014) and Bourdieu, Breda (2015). One difficulty here is that only worker tenure in the establish-
ment is measured. However, complementary analyses using the “worker representative” part of the survey reveal 
that it is rather tenure as a representative in the establishment that explains the sentiment of discrimination felt by 
representatives, and not their tenure in the establishment (Breda, 2014; Bourdieu, Breda, 2015).
2017 Special Edition – Travail et Emploi –  21
Under-Paid Shop Stewards: A Case of Strategic Discrimination?
penalty related to these activities, the cost of which is to be borne by the employer. 
The time off for these activities does however affect the organisation of work at the 
establishment, and could potentially be behind the difference in promotion rates: 
a firm wishing to promote a worker to a position involving a heavy workload may 
choose a worker without time devoted to employee delegation activities who can 
thus invest themselves fully in the new job (see chappe et al., 2016, on this point). If 
we have to file this situation into one of the categories above, should it be classified 
as discrimination or selection?
From the economic point of view, the difference in effective work-related ac-
tivity formally suffices to void the possibility of discrimination in this case. The 
adoption of this stance does however systematically legitimise the wage penalties 
suffered by unionised worker representatives without any discussion of the real mo-
tives that may lie behind these penalties. The current legal position departs from this 
position and, on the contrary, opts for an interpretation that is more favourable to 
employees, in that discrimination is possible even though it is impossible to establish 
exactly the condition of “equal pay for equal work”. The numerous union discrimi-
nation lawsuits that have been won bear witness to this position.
An alternative approach, that is perhaps more apt if we take the strict economic 
point of view, is to value the time devoted to employee representation by recognis-
ing the skills acquired by worker representatives. Along these lines, the Law of the 
17th of August 2015 renders obligatory the evaluation of the skills acquired during 
the term of representation by external certification bodies or the management of 
the firm’s own Human Resources Department. External certification, which already 
existed in 2015, does not necessarily guarantee adequate career advancement. In 
addition, this mostly applies to permanent union officers or those elected for terms 
in senior union positions, leaving to one side the majority of representatives who 
have only little statutory time off for delegation activities (chappe et al., 2015). The 
direct evaluation of skills acquired by union representatives by the firm runs into a 
fundamental problem: when there is a conflict between the interests of the workers 
and the firm (which is generally the case when there is bargaining over the sharing 
of profits), then worker representatives run the risk of “displeasing” the firm. We 
can then legitimately ask how the evaluation of worker skill acquisition by firms can 
work in practice: does this not rather institutionalise a type of labour relations which 
favours the firm over the workers?
Statistical Discrimination
A type of discrimination directly related to selection explains the worse careers 
of union members by the belief, legitimate or otherwise, that they are less produc-
tive. This argument only holds in environments where either productivity or the work 
carried out are only imperfectly measured. In this case, the employer may appeal to 
indirect information on productivity or ability. Here lower union wages are not nec-
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essarily explained by lower union productivity, but rather by the employer’s belief 
that this is the case. This kind of argument is in general evoked for hiring discrimi-
nation rather than discrimination at work in general, which in principle is based on 
long-term interactions between the firm and the worker, where the work carried out 
by the latter becomes increasingly observable.
A similar phenomenon to the dynamic selection described above could however 
be at work: the employer may think that union membership or worker representa-
tion do not indicate lower initial ability, but rather a lack of investment in the job. 
Considering, rightly or wrongly, that union members furnish less effort, employers 
are less likely to promote and reward them. As work on statistical discrimination has 
shown (for example, lundBerg, STarTz, 1983; coaTe, loury, 1993; loury, 2002), 
beliefs can be self-fulfilling: knowing in advance that employers will consider their 
union engagement to reflect a lack of investment in the job, union members have less 
incentive to make investments in their job that will likely not be rewarded at their 
fair value. This rational lower effort by union workers should then be combined with 
another, equally rational, phenomenon of the selection at entry of those workers who 
are prepared to renounce their professional career. While we here present these situ-
ations in a rather caricatural style, these vicious circles should not be dismissed. The 
negative view of labour relations and its actors on the part of employers produces 
conflictual labour relations with a particular type of worker representatives: those 
who are ready to give up their careers.
The evidence from field surveys on these phenomena is however more nuanced: 
certain union members, and notably those in elected office in the firm, are sometimes 
scorned, including by other employees, and accused of taking it easy and taking 
advantage of their time off for statutory activities and their privileged position; how-
ever they are also often considered as particularly active and enterprising, sometimes 
over-invested in the firm, their worker representation activity and their job, if only 
not to be considered at fault by the employer, who is ready to dismiss them for the 
slightest digression. This is reflected in the statistics on delegation hours: union-
ised worker representatives, and especially shop stewards, are more likely than non-
unionised worker representatives to have time off for representation activity, and 
of longer duration. Even so, they often declare that they go over this official figure, 
and spend extra time on representation activity (pak, pignoni, 2014). This is all the 
more true when they belong to the CGT union (eight times more likely to go over the 
official time-off figure than non-unionised worker representatives, holding constant 
the characteristics of the establishment and the firm), Unsa (the Union nationale 
des syndicats autonomes – National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions), Solid-
aires, or independent unions (six times more likely). The example of the dismissal 
of Nordine, a member of the Sud union at GRDF (the gas distribution subsidiary in 
France), and the long fight led by his union and its members to establish the legal 
recognition of the discriminatory nature of this decision and his reinstatement is one 
of many documented examples showing that shop stewards produce work of quality, 
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even though, obviously, the employer may not acknowledge this in times of conflict 
(Barnier et al., 2011).
Strategic Discrimination
Hostility towards union members could in particular be the result of the advo-
cacy position that union membership represents. From a theoretical point of view, 
over and above any taste-based discrimination against unions, or lower pay reflecting 
lower (supposed or actual) productivity, the lower pay of union representatives could 
reflect that they express opposing interests, coming in part from union organisations 
that are external to the firm. In this case, the employer may be tempted to penalise 
union members independently of the quality of their work, and all the more so that 
their union activity represents a threat to the interests of the business during bargain-
ing.9 The lower wages of union workers here, as they are independent of the work 
carried out as an employee, are discriminatory in the legal sense.
The discrimination exerted by the firm is then strategic, and does not refer to 
the worker himself or herself, but rather the potentially successful demands that they 
will make during bargaining. The goal is to dissuade workers from becoming shop 
stewards, and discourage participation in bargaining with the firm and union move-
ments for higher wages.
The effectiveness of this practice depends not only on the effect that it has on 
shop stewards themselves, but also on the signal that it sends to all workers to dis-
suade support for union activity. These indirect dissuasive effects can be considera-
ble. A survey by TNS-SOFRES revealed, for example, that over one-third of workers 
mention the fear of reprisals as one of the reasons for the low rate of union density 
in France. The absence of shop stewards in around two-thirds of establishments with 
over 10 workers (our own calculations), in which their presence is required by Law, 
is another indication of the hesitation of workers to engage in union activity. While 
the strategy of discriminating against the most active shop stewards does not neces-
sarily weaken them immediately, it stands a good chance of undermining the extent 
of collective action in the medium term: firstly because workers will be hesitant to 
directly support union action, and second because some workers will even break 
ranks with the union as a result of the negative signal emitted by the firm against 
them.10
The strategic discrimination wage penalty, which is likely only part of overall 
wage discrimination, does not prevent certain workers from becoming shop stew-
ards. This does not however mean that the strategy has failed. These workers may 
9. As shown strikingly and systematically in the special issue of Agone on this subject, union discrimination does 
not (only) lead to an average statistical wage effect but on the contrary consists of policies that are targeted against 
certain individuals that can cover non-wage domains. There are a number of different ways of taming industrial 
conflict, as set out in giraud (2013).
10. See Breda (2011) for the full analysis of strategic discrimination in a dynamic bargaining model.
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well have other motivations than their career in choosing to be the mouthpiece of the 
union, although this does not mean that workers will not be affected or weakened, 
at least in the longer run, by this discrimination. The depictions of workers who are 
only interested in their salary or, on the other hand, the heroic union worker who 
sacrifices his career for the union cause and who is only strengthened by employer 
harassment are extreme cases that have to be qualified. Many testimonies reveal, 
for example, that the sacrifices initially accepted by some union members finally 
lead to discouragement and even withdrawal (see the experience related by Christian 
corouge in his interview with Michel pialoux in Résister à la chaîne, 2011). The 
intense use of contractual termination by worker representatives when this scheme 
was introduced (Bourdieu, Breda, 2015) suggests that many representatives were 
ready to quit their firm in exchange for severance pay, which they were not able to do 
beforehand due to the control that the labour inspectorate (the inspection du travail 
in France, which ensures the respect of labour Law) had over the conditions of their 
dismissal.
It is difficult to know if the demands made by unions would have been less 
strong had shop stewards been better treated. But the reverse assertion, that dis-
crimination against shop stewards led to greater union demands, seems unlikely as 
a general rule. There have of course been specific cases where particularly visible 
discrimination has led to substantial and costly strife, or criminal convictions as has 
been frequently been observed over the past 15 years. Overall, it nonetheless seems 
that in most cases the strategy of discouraging union activity by punishing its leaders 
is effective for firms.
The question then arises of whether it would not have been simpler and more 
efficient for firms to buy off shop stewards so that they moderate their demands. The 
cost of better treatment, via pay or otherwise, for a small number of worker repre-
sentatives counts for little compared to the benefits that firms can reap by defusing 
some of the union’s demands concerning all of the firm’s workers.
There are a number of real-world examples of this kind of strategy. Notable 
cases of large-scale corruption (the slush funds of the Union des industries et des mé-
tiers de la métallurgie [Union of Metal-Working Trades and Industries – UIMM] to 
facilitate labour relations, notorious cases of abuse of some works councils, etc.) or 
the existence of company unions in certain firms are examples of collusion between 
firms and worker representatives, to the detriment of workers’ interests. However, 
these strategies of collusion are most often not articulated as such by those who im-
plement them, but rather evolve as a kind of tacit agreement between representatives 
and firms who share common individual interests.
This strategy does have its limits. The first is that outright collusion becomes 
visible and leads to worker representatives losing the confidence of workers. Any-
thing that looks like favouritism is looked upon badly by workers, even if it seems 
justified. The example of standby pay, sometimes negotiated in large firms by some 
representatives due to the frequent requests that they receive from management is 
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an apt one here: some see this as a fair reward for the delegates’ implication in their 
work, while others consider it as a way for the employer to buy good labour relations 
(see the case of GRDF described by chappe et al., 2016). A second limit comes 
from the multiplicity of unions present in each firm: as these are in competition with 
each other, they are often quick to denounce any collusion between a union and the 
employer. It is then difficult for the latter to engender a policy of collusion with the 
whole group of union representatives.
We should add here that the cases of collusion (where the representative is 
bought off) and, on the contrary, conflict (where the representative is discriminated 
against) may in practice be complementary and co-exist. The dissuasion via dis-
crimination when union demands are too strong is all the more credible if it is some-
times implemented by the firm. This can help to set up an understanding with union 
representatives who fear being penalised. The denunciation of corruption might not 
suffice to prevent it, but may only serve to increase division between unions and, 
finally, weaken workers’ demands.
In the end, we are not able to conclude here as to the motives that drive firms 
to penalise shop stewards rather than buying them off. We might hypothesise that 
the firm will start by trying to ensure the acquiescence of worker representatives 
via more or less open preferential treatment but, if this does not work or faced with 
union members who are particularly active and little inclined to compromise, may 
well turn to discrimination instead. From an empirical point of view, if the observed 
wage penalties do effectively reflect strategic behaviour, we can conclude that on 
average discrimination outweighs any preferential treatment in wages. The existence 
of strategies with opposing wage effects does mean that when we measure discrimi-
nation by the average wage penalty, we may miss out, within the same firm, cases of 
bonuses paid to compliant representatives and greater wage penalties for those who 
are not. The distinction between unionised and non-unionised worker representatives 
is a good illustration of this potential diversity. And even within the group of union-
ised worker representatives, the average wage penalty of 4% likely encompasses a 
wide variety of situations. This heterogeneity is likely greater than amongst union 
members who are not representatives, who are less likely to be bought off as they 
have no official role affecting the functioning of the firm. As a result, the wage pen-
alties faced by unionised representatives and unionised non-representatives, that are 
on average the same, do not necessarily reflect the same level of discrimination: as 
they have more strategic interactions with the firm, unionised representatives may 
be at the same time both more discriminated against and receive more preferential 
treatment than unionised non-representatives.
Empirically, it is mainly the comparison of the situations of different types of 
worker representatives, according to their official duties, the union to which they 
belong, and the existence of bargaining or conflict at the firm which leads us to 
conclude in favour of the hypothesis of strategic discrimination. The wage penalties 
incurred by worker representatives are in fact systematically aligned with the poten-
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tial cost that they could impose on the firm: the more likely it is that the actions of 
representatives will be effective and lead to wage gains at the firm’s expense, the less 
the representatives are paid.
The first comparison is between unionised and non-unionised worker repre-
sentatives. The statistics on representative activity (pak, pignoni, 2014) show that 
unionised worker representatives are more active: they devote more time to their 
responsibilities and spend more time with workers and representing workers with 
the firm. They also make more propositions regarding the functioning of the firm 
and are more likely to call on outside experts or legal structures; they also draw more 
often on union structures that are external to the firm. As they are more visible, they 
interact more with the employer. It should be added that, due to the support of the 
union structure, they are also better trained and better prepared during the formal 
phase of bargaining with the firm. This is confirmed by the external parties that inter-
vene in the case of conflict or where psycho-social risks have been identified: union 
representatives know the case better and are less likely to be manipulated than their 
non-union colleagues.
The most important distinction, however, is that regarding the function that is in 
principle transferred to shop stewards: the bargaining over wages, employment and 
work conditions that usually takes place every year with the employer. Contrary to 
other representatives whose actions may, at least on paper, rather enhance firm per-
formance, shop stewards are restricted to participation in a zero-sum game: the gains 
that they obtain are principally at the employer’s expense. In other words, it is shop 
stewards who determine the outcome of the fundamental conflict of interest between 
workers and shareholders: how to share the benefits of production. Employers have 
an incentive to limit the influence of shop stewards via discrimination as it is these 
latter who, notably through wage bargaining, lead to lower profits. The analysis of 
shop stewards’ outcomes depending on whether they negotiated wages with the firm 
provides evidence in favour of this interpretation: the 30% of shop stewards who do 
not negotiate with the firm, even though they are mandated to do so, do not suffer 
from lower wages, while those that do are significantly penalised (with wages that 
are between 10 and 20% lower), and even more so when the negotiation did not lead 
to complete agreement with the firm. The estimated wage penalties are also higher 
when there are strikes or other types of conflict with the employer, and especially 
when this conflict was lost by the employees and covered a significant percentage of 
workers in the establishment.11
All of these results suggest greater union wage penalties when they are not in 
a position with greater power (having lost a conflict) and when the costs they can 
impose on the firm are more significant. This diversity of wage effects is all the more 
remarkable that it was not possible to match the wage penalties of shop stewards to 
11. All of these results appear in Bourdieu, Breda (2014).
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more direct measures of their activity, such as hours spent on union work or protec-
tion against firing (Breda, 2014).
Our theory of strategic discrimination does however include a grey area: we can-
not determine if this represents discrimination linked to the local representation of 
the workers in the firm, or rather discrimination linked to the broader representation 
of the union’s interests. While the duties of shop stewards are to negotiate and make 
claims in the interests of the firm’s employees, they also take into account the wider 
interests and demands of the union to which they belong. What we have shown is 
that the wage penalties suffered by worker representatives rise with their bargaining 
power. However, we cannot determine whether the interests for which they bargain 
are those of the firm’s workers or rather of the union that they represent.
Self-Censorship of Worker Representatives
One last explanation can be put forward: the lower wages of certain worker 
representatives may be explained by self-censorship, where they refuse their own 
personal interest in order to devote themselves to defending other workers. A number 
of testimonies reveal that worker representatives consider lower salaries as normal: 
firstly because they are used to them and have never considered the alternative, and 
secondly (and perhaps more importantly), because they are very committed to the 
recognition that goes with their work, which they consider to be incompatible with 
high earnings (Beaux, pialoux, 1999; corouge, pialoux, 2011). The most com-
mitted shop stewards are also suspicious of promotions and pay rises. Their wage 
sacrifice for their colleagues is the ultimate proof of their incorruptibility. Regarding 
a compensation agreement, Fred Dijoud, a representative of the CFDT (Confédéra-
tion française démocratique du travail – French Democratic Confederation of La-
bour) union, quoted by Libération explained that “Some of my colleagues refused to 
sign the agreement [of a remedial wage rise for union members]. They say that they 
knew the risks of their union activity”. A member of the CGT union also claimed 
that “to be discriminated against is proof that we have not been bought off by the 
bosses!”12
•
We find average wage gaps of around 3 to 4% against union workers as com-
pared to non-union workers of the same age, sex and education. These penalties are 
larger and can exceed 10% for those, among union members, who are shop stewards 
and therefore participate in obligatory bargaining with the firm. Union members who 
are worker representatives but not shop stewards have the same wage gap as union 
members who are not representatives.
12. See Hervé Nathan, « Discrimination syndicale : les entreprises se rachètent une conduite », Libération, April 
2nd 2002.
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While we cannot prove beyond doubt that these wage gaps reflect discrimina-
tion, in the legal sense of the term, there are a number of suggestive pieces of evi-
dence. Wage discrimination is in addition the most objective part (legally and statisti-
cally measurable) of a whole set of different types of union discrimination that are 
well-documented in different contributions. Union discrimination is different from 
most other types of discrimination in the sense that it is the consequence of an in-
dividual choice (taking a union mandate). As such, it may well reflect the conflict 
of interest and the balance of power between workers and the firm more than any 
belief on the part of the firm as to the lower ability of union members, or taste-based 
discrimination against them by the firm.
To render the balance of power between workers and firms more favourable for 
the former in the context of rising inequality and worsening work conditions we need 
to improve the capacity of worker representatives to express themselves and defend 
the interests of the workers that they represent. To do so, we could encourage work-
ers to take a greater interest in the actions of their representatives, so that they can 
support and defend them in obvious cases of harsh treatment or malfunctioning. In 
this perspective, this article suggests that we could start by watering down the sub-
ordinate relationship between the firm and the worker representative in order to limit 
the possibility of discrimination or collusion, and on the contrary increase the degree 
of dependency of representatives on the workers that they represent.
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Appendix
Two methodological choices have been made in Table 1. First, we consider only 
employees with a full-time permanent contract, excluding apprentices, interns and 
those in second jobs, with between 900 and 2,200 declared annual hours. The aim of 
these restrictions is to exclude workers in insecure jobs, who are for this reason less 
well-paid than worker representatives and their colleagues. As a result of the job that 
they carry out, worker representatives are less likely to be on temporary contracts 
or to work part-time. We thus consider the wage gap between worker representa-
tives and their colleagues among those with the stable jobs (the “insiders”). On the 
contrary, if we retain all workers in the analysis, including those with more insecure 
jobs, we predictably obtain somewhat smaller wage gaps (Bourdieu, Breda, 2015, 
Table A1).13
Our second choice consists in the use of the weights supplied by the DARES 
in the estimated wage equations. There is no consensus as to the use of weights in 
econometric analysis. Some believe that the causal impact of one variable on another 
should not be established by weighting the observations. But our goal here is not to 
measure the causal impact of being a worker representative on wages, but rather to 
establish the size of these wage gaps in the first place. With this descriptive goal, 
we believe that the use of weights in the estimations is justified in order to produce 
estimations that are the most representative of the whole of the labour market. If we 
do not use weights we obtain wage gaps that are smaller in size (Bourdieu, Breda, 
2015, Table A2).
13. Even though we believe it to be justified in the current analysis, our methodological choice of concentrating on 
“insider” employees can be criticised for the potential selection bias that it creates. We therefore checked whether 
the main results presented here continued to hold when we keep part-time and fixed-term contract workers in the 
sample, adding additional control variables for these statuses in the empirical analysis. In general, the wage penalties 
found in this expanded sample are:
–  slightly lower for unionised non-representative workers;
–  somewhat larger for unionised representatives (and shop stewards) in the specifications without establishment 
fixed effects;
–  a little lower for unionised representatives (and shop stewards) in the specifications including establishment fixed 
effects. With these limited exceptions, the results were very similar.
